A Bridge Over Troubled Waters: Alternative Financing and Delivery of Water and Wastewater Services by Elizabeth Brubaker
C.D. Howe Institute 
COMMENTARY 
A Bridge Over 
Troubled Waters:




Municipal water and wastewater utilities are not serving Canadians well,
and lack the resources to address the challenges ahead. What are 
the options?
NO. 330, MAY 2011
THE WATER SERIESRecent years have seen fierce disagreements over whether Canadian municipalities should
preserve their monopoly over the provision of water and sewage services. Debates in Victoria,
Winnipeg, and other communities have pitted those arguing for improved access to private
capital, expertise, and efficiencies against those arguing that water services should remain outside
of the market. 
This Commentary argues that the status quo, in which most systems are municipally owned and
operated, is not viable. Many of the systems that treat and distribute drinking water perform
poorly, many of those that collect and treat sewage are substandard, and many of both systems
need more capital investment.
This Commentary examines the role of markets in water and sewage services. Canadian
municipalities have little experience with the private financing and operating of water and sewage
services. Yet many municipally owned and operated utilities have insufficient capacity to meet
their challenges without private-sector expertise and financing. 
To encourage municipalities to seek competitive offers for water and sewage construction and
operation, upper levels of governments should:
• reduce grants for water and sewage infrastructure;
￿ legislate full-cost pricing of drinking water and sewage treatment;
￿ publish information on utility performance; and 
￿ enforce laws governing public health and the environment. 
To get the most out of their partnerships with private service providers, municipalities should use
competitive procurement processes and vigorously enforce performance-based contracts. Public-
private partnerships, if approached in that way, are a good solution to a growing and potentially
very serious problem. 
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M
unicipal water and wastewater
utilities – the majority of
which are publicly financed,
publicly owned, and publicly operated –
are not serving Canadians well. Many
of the systems that treat and distribute
drinking water perform poorly, and
many of those that collect and treat
wastewater are substandard. These
problems are likely to worsen as
infrastructure ages. More stringent
regulations, which have been
proposed by the federal government,
will pose further difficulties for
municipal utilities.
In what follows, I will show that municipalities
often lack the resources to correct current failings
and address future challenges. They lack the
professional capacity to plan infrastructure
improvements, and the capital to finance them.
Increasingly, they lack the skilled labour to operate
infrastructure. Worse still, they lack the political
will to overcome their deficiencies. Few municipalities
are willing to set water and wastewater rates that
are high enough to pay for sustainable systems.
And few feel real pressure to improve their
performance – especially that of their wastewater
treatment systems – since conflicts of interest
prevent public regulators from vigorously
enforcing environmental laws and regulations
against public utilities. 
I will argue that private water and wastewater
services providers are, on the other hand, potentially
well positioned to help municipalities address the
challenges they face. Many have access to large
pools of capital. Many have been in the business
for decades and have developed extraordinary
operating expertise. Engaged through competitive
contracting and governed by performance-based
contracts, private providers have incentives to find
efficiencies and perform well. Competition can
also improve publicly run operations even if
services are not eventually privatized.
Alone, private operations are not a panacea.
Private service providers – if installed without
competition or constrained by limited water
revenues or by the limited aspirations of their
municipal partners – do not always realize their
potential. Only if financing and enforcement are
reformed will private operations provide the full
benefits that they are capable of delivering. 
Municipal Utilities: Poor Performance
and Insufficient Capacity to Improve 
Municipal water and wastewater utilities are not
serving Canadians well. Across the country,
hundreds of facilities, most of which are owned
and operated by municipalities, are threatening
both public health and the environment. 
Poorly Performing Drinking-Water Systems
Municipal drinking-water utilities frequently fail
to comply with operating or reporting requirements.
In Ontario, for example, during the 2008/09 fiscal
year, more than half of the 700 municipal
drinking-water systems violated provincial
requirements. Inspectors identified several common
problems, including improper operation of
equipment, insufficient documentation of
procedures, and inadequate maintenance of
chlorine residuals in distribution systems. That
year, 198 systems also exceeded the limits for total
coliforms and E. coli bacteria in treated water, and
47 systems exceeded the limits for chemical
contaminants (Chief Drinking Water Inspector
2010). See Box 1 and the Appendix for a detailed
discussion of utility failings.
Substandard Wastewater Systems
Wastewater systems are in even worse shape than
drinking-water systems. They are among the
I would like to thank Olena Loskutova for her assistance in researching utility performance, Benjamin Dachis for his expert editing and
advice, and C.D. Howe Institute staff and external reviewers for their valuable feedback on drafts of this Commentary. The author routinely
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country’s largest sources of pollution, dumping
more than 150 billion litres of raw sewage – and
approximately 1.35 trillion litres of only partially
treated sewage – into waterways every year
(Government of Canada 2010b and Environment
Canada 2010a). The former environment
minister, Jim Prentice (2009), acknowledged the
need to curb sewage pollution, saying, “perhaps
the most important way in which we can help
improve the water quality of Canada’s rivers and
lakes is to work with the provinces and
municipalities to address wastewater.”
The Canadian Council of Ministers of the
Environment (CCME) has identified 949
wastewater facilities (of the more than 3,700
systems across the country) that need to be
upgraded to provide “secondary” treatment, which
is the minimum acceptable level of treatment in
the United States. Of these, CCME has
determined that 399 pose high risks to the
environment (Government of Canada 2010b). 
The limited information that is available on the
performance of sewage-treatment plants suggests
there is frequent noncompliance with provincial
laws and regulations. Ontario’s compliance reports
for 2008 showed that 102 municipal wastewater
facilities exceeded permitted limits (Ontario
Ministry of the Environment undated).
Looking Ahead: Anticipating Operating and
Financial Challenges
Water and wastewater systems, which are already
performing poorly, will face further challenges as
infrastructure ages, as population growth spurs
demand, as climate change stresses water supply
and infrastructure, as the costs of electricity and
other inputs rise, and as the Internet makes it
harder to hide utility failings. 
In the late 1970s, after a construction boom in
the previous decades, many municipalities began
to neglect their infrastructure, thus setting off a
vicious cycle of deferred maintenance, deterioration,
and a growing backlog of repairs. In the 1990s,
downloading by provincial governments increased
municipal responsibilities without proportionate
increases in revenues. Politicians often preferred to
spend limited municipal capital on more visible
services with greater political payoffs, resulting in
further deferrals of investment and further
deterioration of infrastructure. Although
investment in new water-supply stock increased in
Across the country, boil-water or do-not-consume advisories are common. More than 1,500 were in
effect in November 2010 (Water Chronicles 2010). While advisories most often concern very small
systems, such as those serving trailer parks or campgrounds, large cities are not immune. A million
Vancouver residents had to boil their water for 12 days in 2006. In the worst cases, inadequate
treatment at municipal facilities makes people sick or even kills them. In 2000, in Walkerton, Ontario,
E. coli and Campylobacter bacteria in municipally supplied drinking water killed seven people and made
2,300 sick. The following year, Cryptosporidium contaminated the drinking water in North Battleford,
Saskatchewan, causing 6,000 to 8,000 people to fall ill.
Another indication of the state of Canada’s drinking-water systems is the amount of treated water
that is lost from broken or leaking distribution pipes. Although Environment Canada’s estimate
(2010b) that municipal water losses average 13 percent nationally is not alarming, other estimates do
give cause for concern. The National Research Council suggests that typical losses are 20-30 percent
and, sometimes, especially in older systems, as high as 50 percent (Hunaidi 2000). Such losses may be
both environmentally harmful and economically inefficient. 
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the 2000s, wastewater investment continued to
lag. As a result, by 2007, wastewater-treatment
facilities had, on average, reached 63 percent of
their useful life nationally, and 60 percent in
Ontario (Gagnon et al., 2008).
As they grapple with aging infrastructure,
utilities can anticipate having to meet more
stringent standards. In March 2010, the federal
government introduced draft regulations for
wastewater system effluent. The regulations, if
adopted as proposed, will require a minimum of
secondary treatment for all of the 949 substandard
systems identified by the CCME. The worst 399
systems will have to comply by 2020; another 550
will be given more time. In Ontario, the
Environmental Commissioner (2010) has called
for still more rigorous standards, which would
increase both the complexity and the costs of
operations, posing further difficulties for utilities
that are already struggling.
Inadequate Expertise
Many municipal utilities are ill-equipped to deal
with this host of new challenges. They lack the
necessary expertise at all levels – planning,
management, and operations. Many utilities do
not have the professional skills required to oversee
increasingly complicated and technically
sophisticated operations.
1 The ability of utilities to
deal with more routine challenges may be
compromised by a shortage of qualified operating
staff. Since the Walkerton tragedy, municipalities
across Canada have striven to train utility
employees better and to certify them. Despite
considerable progress, problems persist. A recent
labour-market study revealed that more than half
of the municipalities surveyed had trouble attracting
and retaining qualified operators. Indeed, many
said this was the biggest challenge they deal with
in their water and wastewater facilities. The
shortage of skilled labour is expected to become
greater with an aging workforce and upcoming
waves of retirement, leaving smaller communities
especially vulnerable (ECO Canada 2010). 
Limited Financial Capacity
Municipal utilities lack the managerial and
financial skills – and incentives – to oversee
efficiently the large capital improvements that
many will require. Water and wastewater projects
are noted for cost overruns and construction
delays.
2 Nor do many municipal utilities have the
financial capacity to meet the challenges they face
because water usage revenues do not cover
operating and capital costs. In 2007, municipal
water revenues were equal to just 70 percent of
1 The Canadian Water and Wastewater Association (2010, ii) complained that the proposed federal wastewater regulations are so complex that
even its members from large and sophisticated utilities have difficulty understanding them. It warned, “it is difficult to imagine that small
utilities with fewer resources available to them will be able to comprehend and implement activities to bring them into compliance.”
Infrastructure Canada (2004, 9) bemoaned the inadequacy of data-management capabilities, saying that many municipalities “lack the
expertise and the information needed to monitor infrastructure, and to assess the need for new or upgraded water infrastructure. Without a
system of data collection and monitoring, it is almost impossible to make an informed decision on whether to repair, expand, or upgrade
infrastructure.” The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (2010, 89) sounded a similar note when lamenting the failure of wastewater
utilities to optimize their systems to improve performance and avoid the need to expand: “Many facilities (particularly smaller ones) lack the
specialized staff, expertise and sensor equipment required to run an optimization program.” 
2 The cost of the new sewage-treatment plant in St. John’s, Newfoundland, soared from its initial budget of $93 million to $144 million.
Calgary’s Pine Creek Wastewater Treatment Centre likewise saw costs skyrocket, with initial estimates variously reported as between $220
and $270 million, and a final price tag of between $430 million and $450 million. So, too, with the cost of upgrades to Winnipeg’s West
End Water Pollution Control Centre, which increased from $26 million to $47 million. Such projects, the mayor explained, have simply
proved beyond the city’s abilities to deal with (White 2009). 
Bent Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), who examined construction cost overruns in 258 transportation infrastructure projects, found that costs were
initially underestimated in almost 90 percent of the projects and that actual costs were on average 28 percent higher than estimated costs.
The authors maintained that other types of projects are at least as, if not more, prone to cost underestimation. They noted that the problem
has not diminished over time: “No learning seems to take place.” They concluded that such systematically misleading estimates “cannot be
explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying.” Those promoting such projects, they suggested, have
strong incentives and weak disincentives to underestimate the costs.| 4 Commentary 330
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recorded expenditures and a far smaller portion of
the full costs of service provision, which would
include the cost of building adequate infrastructure
and the environmental costs of water and
wastewater operations (Renzetti 2009). The
widespread underpricing of these services has
inflated demand, thereby prompting unnecessary
expansion of infrastructure, creating unnecessary
environmental impacts, and unnecessarily raising
operating costs. It has also left utilities with
insufficient capital to invest in legitimate
infrastructure.
Not much information is available about
current capital expenditures and projected capital
needs. Statistics Canada (2009) found that $885
million had been spent to add, expand, or upgrade
drinking-water plants in 2007.
3 Ontario’s data are
more comprehensive. That year, Ontario
municipalities reported $975 million in capital
expenditures on waterworks systems. The combined
capital expenditures for waterworks systems,
sanitary sewer systems, and storm-water systems
in Ontario amounted to $2.1 billion in 2007 and
$2.2 billion the following year (Ontario Ministry
of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2007; 2008).
Many people believe that capital needs dwarf
current capital expenditures.
4 Estimates of
projected needs vary considerably and are
unreliable for three reasons. First, they rely on
insufficient data. Many municipalities lack a
complete inventory of their underground
infrastructure or have not fully assessed its capacity,
condition, or performance. Second, they often
rely on data obtained from surveys of those who
have an incentive to overstate their capital needs
in order to attract more provincial and federal
grant money. And third, they generally assume
that the current pricing policies will continue. In
the absence of prices that cover the full costs of
providing water and wastewater services, it is
impossible to know the true demand for such
services or the amount of infrastructure required
to meet it (Kitchen 2003). 
Despite these uncertainties, it appears that
many tens of billions in capital investments will
be needed across the country to meet even the
existing standards. The need could grow even
larger as utilities face new regulations. For example,
it will likely cost municipalities between $6 billion
and $13 billion to meet the proposed federal
wastewater treatment regulations, and billions
more to curb overflows from combined sewers.
5
Ontario has made its own estimate of capital
requirements. The province calculated that
municipalities would need $34 billion between
2005 and 2019 for their water and wastewater
systems, including $25 billion for capital renewal
and $9 billion to meet projected growth.
Comparing this required investment to current
investment rates, the province identified an
investment gap of $1.2 billion a year, or $18
billion between 2005 and 2019. “[W]ithout
3 The agency did not collect information on water distribution systems.
4 In 1996, the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (1996) calculated that between $79 billion and $90 billion in
capital would be needed over the following 20 years – between $38 billion and $49 billion to maintain existing stock and services, and $41
billion to meet new capital demands. It noted that this was a conservative estimate that fell more than $10 billion below high-end
projections. In 1998, the Canadian Water and Wastewater Association (1998) very tentatively projected that municipalities would need to
invest $90.4 billion:  $27.5 billion in water, $61.4 billion in wastewater, and $1.5 billion in metering – over the following 15 years. In 2007,
the Federation of Canadian Municipalities reached a similar conclusion, estimating that municipalities needed $87.6 billion for water and
wastewater infrastructure – $31 billion to upgrade existing infrastructure and an additional $56.6 billion for new infrastructure (Mirza
2007). The Canadian Water Network (2005) reported that it would cost $39 billion to maintain existing water and wastewater stocks and
services, and up to $90 billion over a 10-year period to replace and upgrade infrastructure. Economist Harry Kitchen (2003, 11) summarized
the more alarming conclusions of a 1999 study conducted by Guy Felio for the National Research Council: “Replacement costs for water
were expected to total $56 billion over the fifteen year period from 1997 to 2012 with new investment ranging from $6.1 billion to $11.5
billion. For wastewater, replacement costs were estimated to be $86 billion from 1997 to 2012 and new investment was expected to range
from $7.5 billion to $10.7 billion.” 
5 Federal officials estimate the proposed regulations will cost wastewater system owners and operators $5.9 billion, discounted to 2010 dollars
(Government of Canada 2010b). The Canadian Water and Wastewater Association (2010) calls these costs “seriously underestimated,”
noting that the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment previously estimated $13 billion for capital costs alone. According to the
Federation of Canadian Municipalities (undated), the regulations will cost at least $13 billion.Commentary 330 | 5
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significant changes to the system,” it warned,
“sustainability will be an issue in over 100
municipalities” (Ontario Ministry of Public
Infrastructure Renewal undated, 4). 
Unsustainable Reliance on 
Infrastructure Grants 
Many municipalities will have trouble finding the
capital needed to maintain and upgrade their
infrastructure. Many will doubtless continue to
look to upper levels of government for assistance.
But grant programs cannot possibly fund all
municipal water, transportation, recreation, and
other infrastructure needs. The capital required
dwarfs the $8.8 billion in the Building Canada
Fund and the $12 billion in Canada’s Economic
Action Plan. Furthermore, several of the current
funding programs will expire in 2011 and 2014.
Concern about the large deficits facing the federal
and provincial governments make unlikely the
renewal of current programs at current scales. 
The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario
(2010, 85) recently called grants for wastewater
systems unsustainable, explaining, “It is very
difficult for municipalities to responsibly plan,
finance, manage and conserve their wastewater
assets, given the temptation of rare, unpredictable,
but often large grants.” Depending on the
circumstances, grants can encourage too little
investment in infrastructure or too much. On the
one hand, the possibility of getting “free” money
tempts municipalities to delay making necessary
investments, and in fact, those that neglect their
infrastructure are often rewarded. On the other
hand, once grants do materialize, they allow a
municipality to invest in unnecessary capacity.
Consumers, relieved of bearing the full costs of
the water they use, overconsume; municipalities,
likewise relieved of incentives for efficiency,
overinvest. Using other people’s money,
municipalities build more infrastructure than 
they need and more than they can afford to
operate and maintain. Ontario’s Expert Panel on
Water and Wastewater Strategy (2005) pointed
this out noting the “sad reality” that “overly
generous grants actually caused many of the
problems in Ontario’s water sector today.” In the
previous decade, 44 percent of capacity had
exceeded current needs. More than $25 billion
had been spent prematurely or “to meet no real
needs whatsoever.” The panel concluded that this
indicated “a serious misallocation of public
money” (Expert Panel 2005, 50, 54). 
In addition to perverting investment decisions,
grants reduce accountability by creating uncertainty
about who is responsible for water and wastewater
infrastructure, or the lack thereof. They also
interfere with the accountability that is part of
independent environmental and health regulation.
Conflicts of interest may paralyze governments
that both finance and regulate water and
wastewater systems. The department that regulates
performance may be reluctant to enforce tough
standards if it knows that doing so will oblige the
department that oversees municipal grants to
support new infrastructure. 
Such reluctance may help explain the federal
government’s actions to protect municipal
polluters in British Columbia. In 2007, it stayed
charges laid under the Fisheries Act by citizens
concerned about wastewater pollution from the
Lions Gate sewage plant; the following year, it
likewise stayed charges laid against the Iona
sewage plant (Georgia Strait Alliance 2007,
2008).
6 Provincial governments have been equally
unwilling to hold municipal utilities accountable
for damage done to public health or the
environment. At the inquiry into the Walkerton
6 Government prosecutors may likewise be reluctant to press for punitive fines against public utilities that violate health or environmental
standards. The large fines imposed on private-sector polluters – such as the $3 million assessed against Syncrude for the deaths of 1,606
ducks in Northern Alberta, or the $187,500 fine (including a victim surcharge) assessed against US Steel for one minute of smoke pollution
from a blast furnace in Hamilton, Ontario – contrast sharply with the modest fines levied against under-performing utilities. In Ontario, the
two municipal drinking water systems fined in 2008-2009 paid just $10,000 and $32,000, respectively. This differential treatment may be
reasonable, since public utilities – having no profits from which to pay fines, and no shareholders to suffer the economic consequences of
poor performance – will simply pass their fines on to ratepayers or taxpayers.| 6 Commentary 330
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7 Water and wastewater systems, being capital-intensive network systems, tend to be thought of as natural monopolies. Since it is generally
uneconomic to install rival networks, in North America, competition (where it exists) tends to be for the market rather than in the market.
Even in England and Wales, where the economic regulator of water services has encouraged competition through cross-border supplies, inset
appointments, and common carriage, competition remains limited. Under cross-border supplies, consumers who are willing to pay the costs
of connection purchase water from regulated suppliers that do not normally service their area. Under inset appointments, new licensees are
appointed to service greenfield sites and large consumers in areas already covered by regulated companies; the new licensees may use the
existing companies’ treatment facilities. Common carriage allows a provider to use a competitor’s network to supply water to a customer.
water tragedy, witnesses from Ontario’s
environment ministry stressed their uniquely
cooperative relationship with municipal water
utilities and acknowledged the ministry’s concerns
about the financial implications of enforcement
(Energy Probe Research Foundation 2001). 
Grants from higher levels of government also
impede private-sector involvement in the financing
and operation of water and wastewater systems.
Free in appearance, though not in reality, public
money trumps more costly private money.
Municipalities prefer grants, whose costs are borne
by provincial or federal taxpayers, to investments
of private capital, which must be repaid by local
ratepayers. For all of the above reasons, the winding
down of grant programs – although sure to
prompt vigorous complaints from municipalities –
will ultimately strengthen utilities.
Private-Sector Solutions to Public-
Sector Problems
Innovative and efficient responses to the challenges
facing Canada’s water and wastewater utilities will
have to involve new sources of financing and
expertise, along with new incentives for better
performance. The best solutions will often include
greater private-sector involvement in both the
financing and the operations of utilities.
Alternative Methods of 
Financing Projects
Investors that put money into water and wastewater
infrastructure and services do so because they see
investments in utilities as stable, predictable revenue
generators. Water utilities in particular, which
provide an essential service and have few competitors,
7
tend to be shielded from economic fluctuations.
Interest in infrastructure investing has grown
considerably in both Europe and North America
in recent years. More than 200 infrastructure
funds have been established, almost half of them
in North America (Papa et al. 2009). Among the
would-be investors are pension funds, which value
the good fit between their long-term payment
obligations and long-term infrastructure
investments – especially when revenues from the
latter are linked to inflation. In the US, a number
of state teachers’ funds and other public funds are
targeting between 1 percent and 5 percent of the
market value of their portfolios toward
infrastructure (Public Works Financing 2009).
Canadian pension funds, which had $800 billion
in invested assets in 2006, are likewise looking at
infrastructure investments. As of 2006, at least
two large pension funds aimed to allocate as much
as 10 percent of their assets to infrastructure
(Burleton 2006). Life insurance companies may
also become important sources of funding. 
Funds dedicated to water investments – though
not exclusively to municipal infrastructure – are
becoming more common: for example, 2007 saw
the Toronto launch of Criterion Water
Infrastructure Fund, which invests in companies
providing water supply, environmental services,
and water technology. Toronto is also home to
several water-oriented venture-capital firms,
including XPV Capital Corporation, which
invests in emerging water companies. Industry
insiders speak of an exuberance in the industry.
The editor of the infrastructure-renewal magazine
ReNew Canada has described the water and
wastewater sector as being “about to explode onto
the marketplace” (Shenker 2009). 
Water companies themselves have capital to
invest. For example, Epcor – which, though
owned by the City of Edmonton, provides water
and wastewater services to more than a dozenCommentary 330 | 7
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other communities in Alberta and British
Columbia
8 – is looking to invest the proceeds 
from the sale of its energy-generating assets. It
expects to have almost $2 billion available for
investments in water, wastewater, and
transmission infrastructure (Gysel 2010). 
Currently, in Canada, the capital market’s
appetite outstrips investment opportunities (Papa
et al. 2010). As a result, pension funds and other
firms are investing abroad rather than at home.
The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan have invested in
water utilities in the UK and Chile. Epcor has
purchased water and wastewater utilities in
Arizona and New Mexico. Oakville-based
Algonquin Power owns 19 water-distribution and
wastewater utilities in the US. The top holdings of
Criterion Water Infrastructure Fund are in Brazil,
the US, France, the UK, and Switzerland. 
Fund managers have, however, invested in some
Canadian water utilities. For example, CAI Capital
Management and the BC Investment Management
Corporation are the principal owners of
Vancouver-based Corix Utilities, which owns and
operates several small systems in Canada,
including the new sewer system in Langford, BC.
Such opportunities remain rare because investor-
owned systems are the exception.
9 Nonetheless,
private money can and, arguably, should be
invested in publicly owned utilities more often. 
The Benefits of Private Financing: Access to
Funding, Risk Transfer, and Efficiency
Municipal utilities can benefit from private equity
and debt in several ways. Most obviously, they will
gain access to funding that has until now been far
too limited to meet their infrastructure needs. Not
only has grant funding been insufficient, but the
financial crisis made conventional debt less
available at attractive terms. Alternative sources of
funding are therefore needed more than ever.
Private funding for water and wastewater
infrastructure promises the associated benefit of
reducing the number of projects competing for
limited public funds, in essence freeing up funds
for other purposes. 
Private funding is also key to transferring
financial risks from the ratepayer and taxpayer to
the private sector – this is one of the most
common arguments for greater private-sector
involvement (Iacobacci 2010; Burleton 2006). It
is generally thought that parties should bear the
risks over which they have the most control. A
consortium that designs, finances, and builds a
facility will have considerable control over the
pace, cost, and quality of construction. It should
therefore bear the risks of the facility’s being
delivered late or above budget or failing to
perform as promised. If the facility does not work,
the consortium, rather than the taxpayer or
ratepayer, should be financially responsible. The
benefits of transferring risks are widely seen as
substantial, and they are given significant weight
in the value-for-money calculations used to
compare traditional procurement with alternative
financing. To be sure, the benefits are not free
since those bearing the risks will be compensated.
Even so, the benefits of offsetting these risks are
valuable enough to justify paying higher financing
or transactions costs.
10
Another advantage of private funding is that it
will be used more efficiently than public funding.
Municipal utilities – and consumers – will
therefore get more for less. Public-private
partnerships (P3s) involving the private design,
finance, and construction of public water and
wastewater infrastructure create powerful
8 There are far more if the 51 communities and 10 counties surrounding Edmonton are counted separately.
9 BC has approximately 178 privately owned water utilities. More than half are very small, serving fewer than 50 customers. The largest,
owned by Epcor, serves White Rock’s population of 20,000.
10 The challenges of effectively transferring risks should not be overlooked. Even under alternative financing arrangements, a municipality may
be left holding considerable risk. Critics of greater private involvement point out that a municipality cannot fully insulate itself. “It is the City’s
responsibility to ensure that sewage is collected and treated and in the end a private consortium or contractor can always walk away, but the
City cannot,” warns one union representative (Canadian Union of Public Employees 2011). A municipality’s residual liability points to the
importance of its negotiating binding contracts with clear penalties, backstopped by letters of credit, performance bonds, or other guarantees. | 8 Commentary 330
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incentives for responsible, lowest-cost, and timely
construction. Private water companies, on their
own or in a consortium with other investors, risk
their own money with no promise of relief from
taxpayers. This motivates them to exercise due
diligence, both commercial and technical, and to
invest prudently. Commercial discipline will help
filter out projects that are not viable, such as those
that are premature or oversized or involve
inappropriate technologies. 
If the private partners finance a project and are
not paid until its completion, they will have
strong incentives to manage construction
effectively and complete it on time. Delays in
construction schedules or technological problems
that push back delivery dates will increase their
debt-servicing costs. Private finance is thus an
important efficiency driver (Iacobacci 2010).
Experience in other sectors confirms the
efficiencies of private financing.The Conference
Board of Canada examined the projects
undertaken since 2004 under the auspices of
provincial P3 agencies. Of the 19 completed
projects (none of which were municipal water or
wastewater projects), 17 were delivered early or on
time, and two were delivered up to two months
late. The projects often brought considerable
efficiency gains for taxpayers. Savings per project
ranged from less than 1 percent to more than 61
percent, or from a few million dollars to more
than $750 million (Iacobacci 2010).
11
So, too, with experience in the UK. The UK
Comptroller and Auditor General (2003)
examined 37 projects – including hospitals,
prisons, and roads, but not water, which has been
privately provided since 1989 – that had been
procured under that country’s Private Finance
Initiative (PFI). Focusing on construction cost,
timing, and quality, they compared the PFI results
with historical experience of public-sector
contracts. They found that  only 22 percent of the
PFI projects had exceeded budgeted costs,
compared to 73 percent of the earlier public-
sector projects. Furthermore, only 24 percent of
the PFI projects were delivered late, compared to
70 percent of the public-sector projects. They
concluded that “there is strong evidence that the
PFI approach is bringing significant benefits to
central government in terms of delivering built
assets on time and for the price expected by the
public sector.” Other PFI studies found average
savings of between 17 and 20 percent compared
to publicly procured infrastructure (Allen 2001). 
Involving the private sector not only in design,
finance, and construction but also in operations
further increases efficiencies and decreases
financial risks to the public sector. If the same
party designs, finances, constructs, and operates a
facility, it will have incentives to minimize costs
over the entire life of its contract. In designing the
facility, it will take into account not only
construction costs, but also long-term costs
associated with operations, maintenance,
management, and asset replacement. It will strike
an efficient balance between initial investment
and long-term expenditures (Hart 2003). The
bundling of construction and operations can also
provide a kind of insurance for long-term
performance. In conventional procurement, a
builder’s obligations end with the construction
warranty, but when construction and operations
are bundled into a single contract, responsibility
extends to the end of the contract. 
Concerns about Private Financing 
Two common concerns temper the considerable
advantages of private financing. The first is that
some investments in municipal water and
wastewater infrastructure are too small to be of
interest to large investors, such as pension plans.
Although investors interested in smaller projects
appear to be emerging, the transaction costs
associated with P3s may be too great for smaller
11 The Canadian Union of Public Employees, which vigorously opposes P3s and the threats they may pose to union jobs, lucrative benefit
packages, and job-security guarantees, calls the Conference Board study “astoundingly biased and superficial.” It charges, “The assumptions
used in these VfM [value for money] reports, particularly in terms of discount rates and risk transfers, are highly questionable.” Furthermore,
it complains, the study “ignores or dismisses major auditor general criticisms issued recently in several provinces” (Sanger 2010).Commentary 330 | 9
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
projects. It is time-consuming and expensive to
determine whether a P3 provides value for money,
to negotiate a complex contract, and to manage
that contract. PPP Canada, a federal Crown
corporation established to support the development
of P3s, suggests a $50 million floor on the total
project cost for P3s of all types. Larger projects, it
says, can generate greater efficiency gains to offset
the fixed costs of P3 development and procurement.
Similarly, Partnerships BC and Infrastructure
Ontario recommend projects that cost at least 
$50 million as targets for alternative financing 
and procurement. Others put the minimum
threshold for a P3 project at between $40 million
and $100 million (Iacobacci 2010). Still others
suggest that projects of less than $250 million 
may be too small (Burleton 2006).
This limitation is not, however, fatal. Some
water and wastewater projects on the horizon will
cost hundreds of millions of dollars, an amount
that puts them well above even the highest
efficiency floor. Victoria plans to spend more than
$700 million on its new sewage system, and
Winnipeg plans to spend more than $660 million
on upgrades to its existing system. A new
drinking-water system may cost Saint John, New
Brunswick, almost $260 million. But even smaller
projects may be suitable for private financing. As
discussed below, several privately financed projects
have cost under $25 million. Smaller projects may
be financed by water companies themselves,
without a need for institutional investors. Provincial
or federal P3 agencies may reduce transaction
costs – and lower the efficiency floor – by
developing model procurement documents and
otherwise guiding municipalities through the
process. Furthermore, if there is indeed a higher
efficiency floor, smaller projects can be bundled
together to meet P3 requirements. The bundling
of specific projects could be done in conjunction
with, or independently of, the consolidation of
smaller utilities, as recommended by both
Alberta’s Water for Life strategy and Ontario’s
Expert Panel on Water and Wastewater Strategy.
The other common concern about private
financing is that it is more expensive than public
financing since governments can generally borrow
at lower rates than the private sector. However,
governments’ borrowing costs are deceptive. Rates
are lower because governments, which are unlikely
to go bankrupt, are good credit risks. But that is
true only because governments are backstopped by
taxpayers. When projects are financed publicly,
taxpayers ultimately bear the risks of cost overruns
or scheduling delays. In contrast, when projects
are financed privately, the private sector bears such
risks. The higher costs of private financing thus
serve as protection against unforeseen future costs
on taxpayers (Kitchen 2007). One economist
compares this to paying for a warranty: 
In a well-structured P3, the private sector takes on
the risks for an appropriate reward, similar to an
extended warranty on a car. In traditional
procurement, these same total risks and costs are
no less; they are merely borne by taxpayers, and
effectively concealed under a government
guarantee.” (Burleton 2006.)
Public borrowing has another hidden cost, as well.
A government cannot borrow unlimited amounts
at low interest rates. Increased indebtedness may
adversely affect a government’s credit rating,
increasing its borrowing costs. Borrowing at lower
rates today may therefore mean borrowing at
higher rates tomorrow. 
But even in the absence of such considerations,
when public financing costs are unambiguously
lower, private financing need not make a project
more expensive. As discussed above, private
financing creates incentives to reduce construction
and operating costs. These performance incentives
may ultimately be more important than the
relative costs of borrowing. For all of these reasons,
private financing may, in the long run, be less
expensive than public financing (Bettignies and
Ross 2004). 
Canadian Experience with Private Financing
Although Canada does not yet have extensive
experience with private investment in municipal
water or wastewater utilities, the few experiments
that have taken place have been promising. In the
late 1990s, Moncton, unable to acquire provincial
or federal funding for a new water-filtration plant,| 10 Commentary 330
sought private financing. It held a competitive
bidding process that initially saw expressions of
interest from nine consortia. The successful
consortium, which consisted of USF Canada
(now Veolia Water Canada) and the Hardman
Group, designed, financed, and built the plant.
The capital cost of the plant was $23 million –
almost $10 million less than the city had planned
to spend. Those savings came in part from a 40
percent reduction in the size of the building,
which was made possible by the winning
consortium’s choice of a particular kind of filtration.
The city was also able to offload design and
construction risks. The consortium agreed to
design and build the plant within 500 days, to be
responsible for cost overruns, and to forgo payment
until the plant was fully commissioned. On
completion of the project, the consortium sold 
the facility to Moncton. The city did not put up
any money for the purchase, however, because the
consortium agreed to lease the facility from the
city for 20 years and to pay for the entire lease 
up front. The city makes monthly capital
repayments.
12
Veolia now operates the plant. Thanks to the
size of the plant and its operational features and
patented technologies, operating and maintenance
costs are lower than they would have been at the
public plant initially proposed.
13 An independent
review of Canadian P3s reported Moncton’s
experience to be a “success” (Vining and
Boardman 2008). 
Private financing has also benefited Taber,
Alberta, which entered into a design-build-
finance-operate agreement with Epcor. The firm
and its partners constructed a new wastewater
treatment plant for a fixed price on a guaranteed
schedule. They reduced construction costs by
converting a decommissioned tank from the
previous system into a primary clarifier. The
capital cost of approximately $15 million compared
favourably to initial engineering estimates of $28
million. Epcor will run Taber’s water and
wastewater systems for 20 years (Lifton 2010).
14
Other municipalities are currently looking at
private financing for a portion of their water
infrastructure. In June 2010, the City of Saint
John, New Brunswick, decided to apply to PPP
Canada for funding for a new drinking-water
filtration plant. At present the city does not filter
its water – rather it screens, chlorinates, and
fluoridates it. However, it has had a number of
drinking-water problems, including eight boil-water
advisories in the last three years and elevated levels
of carcinogenic byproducts of chlorination. The
anticipated costs of a filtration plant have almost
tripled since 2009, inspiring councillors to
consider private funding options.
In January 2011, Sudbury’s city council voted
to undertake a new biosolids management project
through a P3. The city, which has been disposing
of its foul smelling sewage sludge in a tailings
pond owned by Vale, the mining company, must
find another disposal method by the end of 2012
when its agreement with Vale expires. It has
applied to PPP Canada for assistance, and it plans
to hold a competition among four pre-qualified
consortia for the design, building, financing,
operating, and maintaining (DBFOM) of a
sludge-processing plant. The city attributes its
choice of a DBFOM model to its own limited
access to capital (the plant is expected to cost
between $30 million and $40 million), its
inability to meet tight construction deadlines,
C.D. Howe Institute
12 Unless otherwise noted, information on water companies and their clients, performance, and investments was obtained from their web sites
or from correspondence between them and the author. 
13 Veolia reports annual operating and maintenance savings of 12 percent, totalling $2 million. City officials have been very pleased with the
relationship. “In the last 10 years,” said Ensor Nicholson, Moncton’s director of water systems, “you couldn’t find one spot on our record”
(Foster 2010).
14 Another example of a water company bringing savings through an innovative design can be found in Okotoks, Alberta. Okotoks and Epcor
have a 20-year agreement covering the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the community’s water and wastewater utilities.
Epcor completed an $11.2 million upgrade to the wastewater treatment plant in 2006. The plant’s design saved the town $13.5 million over
initial estimates. Among other things, it took advantage of existing facilities and buildings, thereby reducing land requirements and bringing
project costs down (Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships 2006).Commentary 330 | 11
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and its wish to transfer risks, especially the
risk that the facility will not be completed on
time, to the private sector. The city’s consultant
estimates the value of risk avoidance to be $10
million over the 20-year contract. The city also
believes that a DBFOM model will maximize its
access to private-sector innovation and expertise
and provide a single point of accountability
(City of Greater Sudbury 2011; Whitehouse 2011).
Private Operation of Public Utilities
Moncton and Taber provide a model for other
municipalities to emulate. In addition to
financing water and wastewater systems, the
private sector can and should manage, operate,
and maintain them. Many municipal utilities
will benefit from private water companies’
experience and expertise.
15 The large firms also
invest considerable sums in research and
development (R&D). Suez Environnement has
an R&D budget of US$95 million for water
research. Veolia Water’s R&D budget is even
larger, at $150 million a year. These research
capabilities have produced patented technologies
and other sophisticated tools to meet municipal
water challenges around the world. 
Canadian Experience with Private
Operations
The breadth of experience and knowledge
offered by many private firms; the in-depth
understanding of water systems; the specialized
planning, technological, and operational skills;
and the ability to access a larger network of
talent and other resources when local skills do
not suffice are especially valuable to smaller
municipalities. Such considerations played an
important role in the decision by Brockton,
Ontario (the municipality that includes the
town of Walkerton) to contract out the
operation and maintenance of its water and
wastewater systems. For several years after the
Walkerton tragedy, Brockton used the services
of the Ontario Clean Water Agency (OCWA),
the Crown Agency that operates more than five
hundred municipal water and wastewater
systems. In 2006, after a competitive process
that attracted four proposals, Brockton selected
Veolia Water Canada as its operator. With
operations and maintenance costs 60 percent
below those of OCWA, the municipality expects
to save $1.5 million over the five-year contract –
savings that it will be able to invest in the
system (Saunders 2009). 
However, large, international firms are by no
means the only – or even the best – qualified
water-services providers. Small, specialized firms
may provide specific operator training and
support programs to certain communities, such
as First Nations.
16 Their location and assets may
give them quick access to remote communities.
17
They may also assist municipalities with specific
tasks, such as data collection and the production
of annual reports, or provide oversight rather
than hands-on operations. 
One factor limiting Ontario’s experience with
private water and wastewater service providers is
15 Several of the large water and wastewater companies – Veolia, United Water, American Water, Epcor – have been in the business for
well over a century. They employ thousands and serve tens of millions in North America. American Water provides approximately 
16 million people in 1,600 communities with water and wastewater services. Veolia Water North America provides services to more
than 14 million people in approximately 650 communities. United Water serves 7 million in almost 250 communities. The large
multinationals have extraordinarily broad networks to draw upon. Worldwide, Veolia Water has 83,000 employees. It supplies 
95 million people with drinking water and 68 million people with wastewater services. Suez Environnement, the parent of United
Water, has 62,000 employees worldwide. It provides drinking water to 68 million people and wastewater services to 44 million.
16 In 2005, after E. coli contaminated the water in Kashechewan, in northern Ontario, prompting the airlift from the reserve of more than
1,100 residents, the federal government called in Northern Waterworks, a firm that then operated 11 water and wastewater facilities in
northern Ontario. The firm’s technician flew into the community and repaired the malfunctioning chlorination system in less than six
hours (Brennan 2005). The firm now operates the system, along with 44 other facilities.
17 For instance, with an office in Red Lake, in northwestern Ontario, and a fleet of three aircraft, Northern Waterworks can quickly reach
troubled facilities in remote northern locations.| 12 Commentary 330
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the existence of a public competitor, OCWA. This
Crown Agency is widely viewed as having an
unfair competitive advantage, especially over new
entrants and smaller competitors. Its history of
subsidies, its close relationship with the province,
its extensive infrastructure, and its market share,
which was gained, not through merit, but through
government fiat, led a representative of United
Water to call it “the most serious impediment to
the creation of a competitive environment in
Ontario” (Paisley and Brubaker 2001).
18 Other
water-services providers have likewise expressed
frustration over the difficulties of competing with
OCWA on an uneven playing field.
Incentives for Efficient Operations through
Competitive Contracting
Municipal operations can benefit, not just from
the expertise of private firms, but also from the
innovations, efficiencies, and resulting cost savings
that competitive contracting brings. Given the
monopolistic nature of most water and wastewater
systems, competition is generally for the market
rather than in the market. It is the former –
competition between firms for operating and
maintenance contracts – rather than the latter –
competition between firms for individual
customers – that motivates bidders to reduce
costs. Although price is rarely the sole determining
factor, a bidder will be more attractive if it can
bring its price below its competitors. Provided the
request for proposals specifies performance and
outputs rather than particular methods and
technologies, each bidder has incentives to find
efficiencies, be it through staff reductions,
reductions in energy use, economies of scale, the
elimination of waste and duplication, creative
re-use of existing infrastructure, computerized
monitoring and control, new technologies, or
detailed asset-management planning.
After the bidding process has been completed,
contracts can continue to promote efficiencies.
Milwaukee’s wastewater contract with Veolia
encourages the firm to reduce energy use by
making the firm liable for 25 percent of monthly
energy costs. The contract likewise encourages the
firm to propose capital projects (which the
sewerage district will fund) by splitting cost
savings from such projects evenly between the
district and the firm. 
To ensure that operating savings do not
necessitate greater capital expenditures in the
future, long-term agreements can assign to the
service provider the responsibility for both
operations and capital improvements. Such an
agreement might have avoided a controversy for
Hamilton, Ontario, which contracted out water
and wastewater operations to Philip Utilities
Management Corporation (PUMC) in 1995.
Critics alleged that PUMC’s reductions in
operating costs increased the city's capital costs.
The operator, critics charged, overpumped water
during off-peak hours, when power rates were
lower, thereby raising the pressure in pipes and
causing some to rupture (McGuiness, 1999.) The
city and the operator denied the allegations,
blaming ruptures on the age of the pipes.
Operations reverted to the city in 2005.
Caveats
There has been little formal Canadian study of
efficiencies resulting from engaging private water
and wastewater operators. As experience with
private operations remains limited, so too does
evidence of efficiency gains or losses. Most case
studies have been conducted by industry advocates
or critics representing labour. Claims of operating
savings often come from the industry or
municipalities but are not accompanied by enough
information to make independent verification
possible. Furthermore, before-and-after comparisons
are complicated by changes that may accompany
the contracting out of operations. The private
operator may have been brought in to solve an
18 OCWA lost almost $60 million – albeit in steadily decreasing amounts – on its utility operations between 2000 and 2009. Although
OCWA’s mandate is to provide services on a cost-recovery basis, corporate policy enables it to reduce its prices in order to win contracts.
Some of its contracts do not recover all direct costs, let alone overhead (Office of the Auditor General of Ontario 2009, 2010).Commentary 330 | 13
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expensive problem, or it may be operating
different equipment or operating to a different
performance standard. In such cases, the public-
cost portion of the comparison may be projected
rather than actual.
19
Evidence of Cost Savings from 
Private Operation
While they should be viewed with those caveats in
mind, a number of before-and-after comparisons
do suggest that substantial savings are possible.
Operating savings in Moncton and Brockton are
mentioned above. Canmore, Alberta, has likewise
benefited from the efficiencies of a private
operator. In 2000, Canmore signed a 10-year
utility-management agreement with Epcor for
water and wastewater, and in 2010 they renewed
the contract. Because Canmore received a fixed
price for the first five years of the contract, which
guaranteed there would be no cost increases due
to growth-related infrastructure, the rapidly
growing town saved more than $1 million over
this period.
20
Experience in the US confirms that private
operations are often more efficient than public
operations. There, the contracting out of water
and wastewater services has achieved operating
cost savings of between 10 and 50 percent
(Brubaker 2002; Burleton 2006). That said, the
evidence suggests that savings arise more from
competition than from the fact that the operations
are private (Ouyahia 2006). Germà Bel and
Mildred Warner (2008) reviewed all of the
econometric studies published between 1976 and
2006 comparing the costs of public and private
water services. Eleven of the studies examined
experience in the US. Three of them concluded
that private production is less costly, three
concluded that public production is less costly,
and five found no significant cost difference
between private and public provision. While Bel
and Warner found that private ownership did not
guarantee cost savings, they also found that
competition for contracts did reduce costs. “The
popular literature typically confuses privatization
with competition,” they noted, adding that too
often competition is either not present or erodes
over time.
21
Bel and Warner also examined three studies
comparing public and private utilities in England
and Wales. One found higher inefficiencies in
private firms; one found very small technical
changes and productivity improvements after
privatization; and one found that the strict price-
cap regulation that accompanied privatization
induced efficiency improvements. Economic
regulation can indeed create incentives for
19 Comparisons of the efficiency of different facilities, public and private, are made difficult by both the considerable differences among them
and the paucity of data on whether facilities are publicly or privately operated. Statistics Canada collects information on the costs of
providing drinking water across Canada. It notes that costs reflect differences in the source, availability, and quality of raw water, the
treatment technology, plant size, and other factors; it does not assess the influence of public or private provision on costs. For 2007, Statistics
Canada (2009) reported large variations in labour costs – the largest component of operating and maintenance costs – between provinces.
The labour costs per thousand cubic metres of treated surface water ranged from $28.20 in British Columbia to $120.40 in Saskatchewan.
The labour costs per thousand cubic metres of treated groundwater ranged from $27.80 in Newfoundland and Labrador to $390.50 in
Saskatchewan. Such variations between provinces whose services are primarily provided publicly suggest the importance of many other factors. 
The Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing attempts to benchmark the efficiency and effectiveness of drinking water, storm
water, and wastewater systems through its Municipal Performance Measurement Program. Like Statistics Canada, however, it does not collect
information as to whether systems are publicly or privately operated.
20 The town saved another $3 million on drinking-water treatment as a result of Epcor’s decision to install an innovative UV disinfection
system instead of constructing, as the town had proposed, a new reservoir that would have allowed drinking water longer contact time with
chlorine (de Soto 2010). Sooke, BC, has also enjoyed considerable savings. Epcor designed, built, and now operates Sooke’s new wastewater
system. Operating costs are said to be 60 percent below original estimates (Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships 2006).
21 In the absence of competition, a municipality cannot be certain that it has got the best deal. Such was the case in Hamilton, Ontario, which
sole-sourced its water and wastewater operations to PUMC in order to aid the local company and encourage economic development.
Although the agreement brought moderate savings and investment and permitted the city to offload labour-relations problems, it did not
solve the performance problems plaguing the city’s systems (Brubaker 2002).| 14 Commentary 330
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efficiencies in the absence of competition.
Canadian regulators could learn much from
Ofwat, the economic regulator in England and
Wales, which has developed considerable expertise
in incentive regulation, benchmarking (or
“yardstick competition”), and methods of
promoting genuine competition in the water
industry (Brubaker 2002). 
Other analysts have likewise found the
international literature on efficiencies achieved
through private management to be unclear.
Roberto Martinez Espiñeira et al. (2009) reviewed
four studies showing public management to be
more efficient, six studies showing private
management to be more efficient, and six showing
no significant differences in efficiency. Much
depended on geographic or socioeconomic factors,
on the reasons municipal governments had chosen
to engage private operators (those seeking to solve
technical difficulties would expect to pay higher
prices), and on the rigour of the regulatory
framework governing water services. 
Accountability Mechanisms
To ensure that a private operator’s quest for
efficiencies and cost savings does not come at the
expense of performance, municipalities must insist
on binding contracts that spell out performance
standards and penalize noncompliance. As long as
the performance metrics are clearly defined and
easily measured and monitored, performance-
based contracts give municipalities a simple,
straightforward enforcement mechanism. The
assurance that the municipality can hold the
private operator accountable for poor performance
has been a key driver of several water and
wastewater partnerships. 
For instance, the desire to improve regulatory
compliance and reduce municipal liability for
operational deficiencies was an important factor in
Canmore’s decision to pursue a P3. The town had
been fined $15,000 for its own operator’s failure
to test and report on chlorine residuals in drinking
water. It had also had trouble retaining qualified
staff to operate its new wastewater treatment
plant. It was keen to enter into a contract with
clear performance measures and quantified
penalties for poor performance. Lac La Biche
County, Alberta, also emphasized its desire to shift
regulatory compliance risks and liability to the
private sector as a major reason for choosing
Maple Reinders and Corix to design, build, and
operate a new wastewater treatment facility
(Kolenosky 2010). 
Performance-based contracts with financial
penalties for poor performance create incentives to
perform well. Such contracts are increasingly
common. Less common are those that include
bonuses for better-than-required performance –
such as Milwaukee’s wastewater contract, which
provides for annual payments (beyond the base
service fee) of US$200,000 if Veolia avoids
bypasses from its separate and combined sewer
systems, US$60,000 if the firm reduces biological
oxygen demand (BOD) in the combined effluents
from two treatment plants to an annual average of
less than nine milligrams per litre, and US$60,000
if the firm reduces total suspended solids (TSS) in
the combined effluents to an annual average of
less than eight milligrams per litre. Conversely, the
firm must pay damages if it performs below
expectations. For example, it must pay
US$100,000 for every milligram of BOD or TSS
in the combined effluents that, on average,
exceeds 13 milligrams per litre. These provisions
in the contract align the interests of the private
operator with those of the public: the operator
benefits financially when the public enjoys a
cleaner environment, and the operator suffers
when the environment deteriorates. 
Performance-based contracts can take other
forms, as well. In Indianapolis (under a contract
expected to end this year), 25 percent of Veolia’s
fees are paid only if the firm meets specified
performance measures, not only for drinking-water
quality, but also for operations and maintenance,
capital planning, and customer service. The 37
components of the incentive plan, many of which
are above industry standards, put almost $10
million at risk for the firm annually.
For maximum accountability, municipalities
should seek long-term concessions that assign to
the private partner responsibility not only forCommentary 330 | 15
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operations and maintenance but also for capital
improvements. Doing so avoids disputes about
how to characterize expenditures, eliminates
incentives to reduce operating costs at the expense
of capital costs, and, most important, reduces the
operator’s ability to blame poor performance on
the municipality’s failure to invest in infrastructure.
22
If something goes wrong, the operator must look
to itself to correct the problem.
One risk associated with long-term contracts is
that that a contract will have to be renegotiated.
As contracts lengthen, it becomes more and more
difficult to foresee future developments. Regulatory,
economic, and political landscapes may change.
Even short-term agreements may be based on
incomplete information and may present
unwelcome surprises. As a result, either water-
services providers or governments may try to
revisit the terms of a contract. Although
renegotiations have been most common in
developing countries, North America has not been
immune.
23 Accountability and efficiency require
that agreements not be easily renegotiated by
either service providers or governments.
Renegotiation, which is generally less transparent
and less competitive than the initial bidding process,
can undermine the legitimacy of the contract.
Moreover, opportunities for contractor-led
renegotiation may attract bidders that excel at
renegotiation rather than at efficient service
provision; they may encourage competitors to
low-ball their bids in the expectation that they will
recover their costs at a later date. Furthermore, the
threat of government-led renegotiation may
discourage investment or increase the cost of
capital. Such problems point to the importance of
including complete and reliable information about
the state of the infrastructure in the bidding
processes, negotiating a clear and binding contract
that includes provisions for adapting to regulatory
and other changes, and having an independent
regulator that balances the needs of the public
effectively and fairly with those of the services
provider (Gómez-Ibáñez et al. 2004; Guasch et al.
2005; Engel et al. 2009). Where both parties agree
that revisiting the terms of a contract will be
beneficial, renegotiation should be transparent
and conducted under the auspices of an
independent body. 
Greater accountability can also stem from
improved environmental and health regulation
because, with private operations, upper levels of
government are more likely to enforce strict
standards. In a private operation, the operator is
separated from the regulator, and thus the
conflicts of interest that may impede enforcement
are reduced. This helps to de-politicize regulation,
thereby freeing up regulators to regulate.
Reducing conflicts of interest was one of the
justifications for privatizing the water and
wastewater systems in England and Wales in
1989. The gamekeeper, it was said, had to be
separated from the poacher. One regulator
described the separation of operations and
regulation as the “most significant gain” of the
British privatization of water utilities (Brubaker
2002, 132). In the decade following privatization,
prosecutions for environmental offences went
from being extremely rare to numbering in the
hundreds, despite greatly improved environmental
compliance.
24
22 In two of North America’s least successful experiments with private operations – those in Hamilton and Atlanta – the operators blamed their
poor performance on factors beyond their control, such as aging infrastructure and inadequate capital investment.
23 The highest-profile attempt to renegotiate a US contract occurred in Atlanta, where United Water complained that it had spent US$10
million on unremunerated tasks and blamed the city for providing inaccurate information during the bidding process. After the city rejected
United Water’s request to raise its annual rate by US$4 million, both parties agreed to terminate the contract. 
24 The conflicts of interest that occur when governments both operate and regulate utilities argue against the partial privatization that is
increasingly popular in Europe (Bel and Fageda 2010). Many municipalities are creating mixed public-private firms that are jointly owned by
local governments and large water-service companies. Such municipalities seek managerial flexibility, economies of scale, and private-sector
expertise while avoiding the transaction costs of P3s and retaining a degree of control over management. However, retaining control in order
to implement political objectives can compromise efficiency. Furthermore, mixed ownership can blur the lines of accountability. An
enforceable, performance-based contract with a purely private firm. provides a more efficient and effective means of maintaining control.| 16 Commentary 330
The separation of operator and regulator has,
according to limited anecdotal evidence, enhanced
enforcement in North America. Following the
contracting out of water and wastewater operations
in Hamilton, the Ontario environment ministry
cracked down on poor performance that dated
back more than a decade. It laid 22 charges in a
year and a half and issued fines in excess of
$217,000. The ministry certainly appeared to
hold the private operator to higher standards than
it had held its public predecessor (Brubaker
2002).
25 In testimony to the Walkerton Inquiry,
then environment minister, Norm Sterling,
confirmed that the province could enforce
regulations more effectively against private
operators than against public operators, since
there would be less political infighting and less of
the interference from municipal politicians that
now hinders the regulation of public utilities
(Energy Probe Research Foundation 2001). The
US Environmental Protection Agency is likewise
believed to enforce rules more vigorously against
private utilities (Henderson 2010).
Transparency also serves to increase
accountability. If a contract and all performance
data are publicly available, environmental groups,
unions, and concerned citizens can hold a poorly
performing operator accountable. Other
accountability mechanisms exist in the market
itself. An operator that performs poorly risks harm
to its reputation, lost business opportunities,
reduced share prices, and the threat of bankruptcy.
The Extent of Private Involvement in
Canadian Water and Wastewater Operations
The private operation of municipal water and
wastewater systems, although still very limited, is
steadily increasing. Its extent can only be
estimated. No publicly accessible database of
private operations is maintained.
26 The figures
vary widely in published reports, in part because
some reports count the number of municipalities
served, others count the number of systems
operated, and still others count the number of
facilities operated. A private firm may operate one
system for several communities. For example, the
CU Water Pipeline, owned by Canadian Utilities,
delivers treated water to eight communities along
one Alberta highway. American Water operates
and maintains the Lake Huron and Elgin Area
Water Supply Systems, which serve 14 communities,
including London, in southwestern Ontario. Or a
private firm may operate only one of a
municipality’s several facilities. Veolia, for
example, operates just the biosolids facility at
Toronto’s main wastewater treatment plant. 
In 1998, Ontario’s now defunct Office of
Privatization reported that about 26 water or
wastewater facilities in the province were operated
by private contractors. In 2001, the Walkerton
Inquiry determined that the number had grown to
42 systems. Four years ago, one service provider
estimated that between 50 and 75 systems in
Ontario were privately operated (Brubaker 2008).
Today, the number of Ontario communities
served exceeds 75. In the western provinces,
private operators serve another two dozen
communities – and far more, if the 51 small
communities and 10 counties surrounding
Edmonton are counted separately. These figures
do not reflect the provision of private oversight
services for publicly operated systems. Nor do
they include the privately owned or operated
systems serving small residential developments,
trailer parks, schools, or other facilities. 
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25 This experience is consistent with that of other utilities in Ontario. Former regulator Mervin Daub compared the Ontario Energy Board’s
regulation of the public electricity monopoly and the private regional gas monopolies, concluding that the former was subject to more
political interference whereas the latter was subject to more focused and regular control (Brubaker 2002).
26 Ontario’s Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (2000 – 2008) tracks the amounts municipalities spend on contracted services but does
not specify the nature of these services. In 2008, municipalities reported spending $544 million on contracted services for their waterworks
and sewer systems. At 16 percent of total expenditures, this was consistent with averages over the previous eight years. These figures, however, have
not generally reflected private operating and maintenance contracts. Far greater sums have been spent on contracts with OCWA.Commentary 330 | 17
Despite recent growth, private water and
wastewater operations remain modest in number
and size. Private operators have gained a secure
foothold only in smaller communities. In larger
communities they tend to play a limited role – if
any – mainly because they encounter fierce
political opposition. Opposition typically comes
from public-employee unions that perceive threats
to their membership, since enhanced efficiency
following contracting out may mean fewer jobs.
To minimize opposition, municipalities often
require their private partners to maintain wage
and benefit levels and to reduce staff only through
attrition or voluntary early retirement, thereby
protecting individual workers.
27
Public opposition derailed Vancouver’s plans for
a privately designed, built, and operated water
filtration plant in 2001. It likewise contributed to
Winnipeg’s more recent decision to scale back its
plans for private involvement in wastewater
treatment. In 2009, the city council voted to
establish an arm’s-length, city-owned water,
wastewater, and solid-waste utility corporation.
The plan included bringing in a private “strategic
partner” to help plan, design, construct, manage,
and possibly finance upgrades to two wastewater
treatment plants, and, potentially, to subsequently
operate them. Initially, the city considered sharing
ownership of a subsidiary of its proposed utility
with the strategic partner. Opposition forced the
city to reconsider. In May 2010, it chose Veolia to
help conduct the wastewater upgrades. Instead of
jointly owning the utility or financing the
upgrades, the firm will help design the upgrades,
supervise construction, and provide advice on
operations for 30 years. Fewer than 15 Veolia staff
are expected to work on the project at any one time.
The Victoria region, too, has faced vigorous
opposition to a P3 for its new wastewater system.
British Columbia required the Capital Regional
District to consider a P3 in order to be eligible for
partial provincial funding. After considering its
options, the region has proposed a “hybrid.”
Although plans continue to evolve, the main
wastewater treatment plant will likely be operated
publicly.
28 The private sector may be called upon
to finance and operate a biosolids-processing
facility and a resource-recovery facility.
Recommendations for Facilitating
Private Involvement
Public opposition to private involvement in water
and wastewater, although common, is by no
means inevitable. Enhancing the public
understanding of current performance problems
and the extent of the improvements in
performance that could be gained through P3s
may help mimimize opposition. In Ontario, the
Environmental Commissioner (2010, 86) has
complained that “the public is left in the dark on
the performance of municipal waste-water
facilities.” Governments that wish to create an
environment conducive to private participation
need to publicize utility failings. Full transparency
is essential to creating a demand for new sources
of funding and more expert operations.
Upper-level governments can take a number of
other steps to facilitate private involvement. They
can provide resources to help municipalities
navigate an unfamiliar – and often daunting –
process. Many municipalities have too little
technical, financial, and legal capacity to assess the
merits of a P3 and negotiate a contract. PPP
Canada and its provincial counterparts can supply
the expertise that municipalities lack. These
organizations can help municipalities seeking
private involvement by providing them with
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27 Not all unions oppose private involvement. Those representing construction workers believe that private capital may facilitate construction
that would not otherwise occur. The Residential and Civil Construction Alliance of Ontario (2007), whose members include several unions,
has endorsed P3s as a means of overcoming the infrastructure funding deficit (Kitchen 2007). The Laborers’ International Union of North
America supports private investment  because infrastructure (albeit not that related to water or wastewater) has presented investment
opportunities for its pension fund. 
28 The region appears to be keeping open a range of private options. In a January 2011 “market sounding” exercise, private concessionaires and
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model requests for expressions of interest and
requests for proposals, along with information to
guide municipalities through the bidding process.
They can distribute model contracts that create
incentives for adept and efficient performance and
include effective monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. Working through these agencies will
often provide comfort to potential bidders, since
the process will be more predictable and reduce
the risk of a deal falling apart at the last minute.
Reforms to the financing of utilities to ensure
their long-term sustainability, whether operated
publicly or privately, can also facilitate private
involvement. Since infrastructure grants decrease
the attractions of alternative financing, reducing
such grants could strengthen municipalities’
incentives to seek private financing for infrastructure
improvements. Upper-level governments should
also encourage pricing reforms. The underpricing
of water and wastewater services, in addition to
promoting waste and undermining the integrity of
municipal infrastructure, discourages private
participation. Prices must be high enough to pay
back private investments and to sustain operations
and maintenance.
29 Full-cost pricing will therefore
help make possible private involvement. Although
recent changes to public-sector accounting
standards – especially those requiring municipalities
to inventory, value, and depreciate their capital
assets – have helped pave the way for pricing
reforms, most municipalities remain reluctant to
charge full prices. Provincial governments will
likely have to legislate this reform and establish
independent economic regulators to enforce it. 
Public education will be crucial to achieving
acceptance of financing reforms. If the higher
prices accompany private-sector involvement,
criticism will likely be especially harsh – a reason
for governments to reform pricing regimes before
embarking on partnerships. Consumers must
understand the roles that both full prices and
private financing and operations play in ensuring
the efficient and effective operations of their water
and wastewater systems. They will doubtless see
the costs; they must also be able to see clear
benefits, be they the lower taxes or lower public
debt resulting from the phasing out of grants, the
greater value-for-money obtained from private
financing and operations, or the better protection
of public health and the environment provided by
expert operators. 
If federal and provincial regulators were to
penalize nonperforming utilities, they would
strengthen the incentive for municipalities to seek
private assistance to improve performance. The lax
enforcement of laws and regulations governing
public health and the environment makes the
status quo quite comfortable for poor performers.
Stricter enforcement would spur demand for the
expert operation and management of existing
infrastructure and the development of new
infrastructure. 
Lastly, in Ontario, the provincial government
can encourage the growth of the private water and
wastewater services sector by disbanding its public
competitor, OCWA. That would create
opportunities for private firms to compete, on a
level field, for the business of the Crown Agency’s
180 clients. 
On its own, private involvement is not a
panacea. Private performance is not flawless, and
some contracts fail to deliver the promised results.
But governments – municipal, provincial, and
federal – can do much to create conditions under
which partnerships can thrive. The keys to
realizing the promise of private financing and
operations are competitive procurement, properly
structured agreements, vigorously enforced
contracts and laws, pricing that supports adequate
infrastructure, and a fully informed public. 
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29 When the high cost of water services creates concerns about equity or public health, it is preferable to subsidize needy users themselves
(through direct payments, tax measures, or other means) than  to subsidize their water use through low prices. Direct subsidies maintain
incentives to conserve – incentives that are lost when the price of water is artificially lowered. Commentary 330 | 19
Appendix: Municipal-Utility
Performance
There is little standard or comprehensive
information on the performance of municipal
utilities. The content, quality, currency, and
availability of information varies from province to
province. To understand the state of drinking
water and wastewater systems across the country,
it is necessary to piece together disparate reports
on water-quality tests, boil-water advisories, leakage,
effluent content, overflows, and facility inspections.
Although crucial pieces of the puzzle remain
missing, a picture emerges of a sector that threatens
both public health and the environment. 
30
Poorly Performing Drinking-Water Systems
Statistics Canada (2009) reports that, in 2007, 4
percent of the drinking-water plants surveyed
31
exceeded federal guidelines for total coliforms – an
indicator of the possible presence of disease
causing bacteria. Furthermore, 20 percent of the
conventional and direct filtration plants surveyed
exceeded guidelines for turbidity; that is,
cloudiness that can interfere with disinfection. 
Provincial data, however, show that poor
performance is more common than suggested by
Statistics Canada. The most recent report of
Ontario’s Chief Drinking Water Inspector (2010),
covering the period from April 2008 through
March 2009, revealed infrequent but widespread
failure of water-quality tests. One-hundred-
ninety-eight municipal systems exceeded
microbiological parameters at least once during
the reporting year, and 47 systems exceeded
chemical parameters. In all, 452 municipal
systems reported 1,769 “adverse water quality
incidents.”
32 Facility inspections uncovered routine
violations of provincial regulations; in fact, fewer
than half of the 700 systems inspected met all
provincial requirements. Inspectors identified a
number of problems at 356 noncompliant
systems, including improper operation of
equipment, insufficient documentation of
procedures, and inadequate maintenance of
chlorine residuals in distribution systems (Chief
Drinking Water Inspector 2010).
Water utilities perform poorly in other provinces,
as well. Approximately 54 of Alberta’s regulated
drinking-water facilities do not meet current
design standards. In 2009, 46 facilities failed to
comply with operational requirements, and 33
had water-quality problems (Alberta Environment
2010). Health authorities in British Columbia
have given high hazard ratings to 398 systems
(British Columbia 2009). In Saskatchewan, too,
inspections have exposed operating and
maintenance problems. In September 2009, 141
waterworks did not maintain adequate chlorine
residuals in their distribution systems, 65 did not
keep adequate records, 16 were dirty or disorderly,
16 had reservoirs in poor repair, and 9 did not
meet minimum treatment requirements.
Furthermore, one-third of the province’s permitted
waterworks failed to submit the required health
and toxicity samples (Saskatchewan 2009). 
Boil-Water Advisories
Boil-water advisories (shown in Table 1) provide
another indication of the breadth of drinking
water contamination across Canada. The Water
Chronicles website tracks do-not-consume and
boil-water advisories nation-wide. In November
2010, it listed 1,513 advisories in effect at the
time. In 2008, an investigative report published in
the Canadian Medical Association Journal called
attention to a total of 1,859 advisories in effect
across Canada (Eggertson 2008). Neither
compilation revealed how many advisories
concerned water provided by municipal utilities
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30 Since none of the comprehensive assessments of utility performance state whether the operators are public or private, the following discussion
of municipal utility performance does not attempt to distinguish between the performance of publicly and privately operated facilities. 
31 In 2008, Statistics Canada surveyed 2,200 plants serving communities of 300 or more people and  received 1,232 responses.
32 The Inspector was not alarmed by these results. On the contrary, he stressed, “We are proud of the levels of protection we have achieved in
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and how many concerned water provided in trailer
parks, campgrounds, or other facilities. Although
very small systems are particularly vulnerable to
advisories, even large cities are not immune. In
2006, high levels of turbidity forced a million
Vancouver residents to boil their water for 12 days.
Water-Borne Illnesses
The frequency of water-borne illnesses across the
country likewise suggests there are widespread
problems with drinking water. Because it is
difficult to determine the cause of any one illness,
and because only a small fraction are reported to
the health authorities, it is impossible to gauge
precisely the number of illnesses caused by
drinking water. By extrapolating from US data,
scientists at Environment Canada, Health
Canada, and two universities have suggested that
90 Canadians may die each year, and another
90,000 may become ill, from drinking
contaminated water (Edge et al., 2001). Some
experts dispute these widely cited figures.
33
However, no one disputes that waterborne
C.D. Howe Institute
33 Edge et al.(2001) based the possibility of 90 deaths and 90,000 illnesses on estimates, from the Centers for Disease Control, that in the
United States 900 deaths and up to 900,000 illnesses may occur annually as a result of waterborne infections. Disease rates in the two
countries may or may not be comparable. 
Table 1: Boil-Water and Do-Not-Consume Advisories in Canadian Water Systems
Sources: Eggerton 2008 (for 2008 data); Water Chronicles 2010 (for 2010 data).
Notes: 
a. By another count, compiled from information provided by five BC Health Authorities, there were approximately 628 boil-water 
advisories in place in BC in May 2010 (Loskutova, 2010).




In Effect in March 2008  In Effect in November 2010
Alberta 13 12
British Columbia 530 327
a
Manitoba 59 95
New Brunswick 2 11
Newfoundland and Labrador 228 268
Nova Scotia 67 74
Ontario 679 79
b
Prince Edward Island 0 1
Quebec  61 308
Saskatchewan 126 337
Yukon 0 0
Northwest Territories 1 1
Nunavut 0 0
First Nations 93 Not tracked separately
Total 1,859 1,513Commentary 330 | 21
illnesses are common and that some have resulted
from inadequate water treatment at municipal
facilities. The best-known outbreak occurred in
2000 in Walkerton, Ontario, where E. coli and
Campylobacter bacteria in municipally supplied
drinking water made 2,300 people sick and killed
seven.
34 The following year, Cryptosporidium in the
drinking water in North Battleford, Saskatchewan,
caused 6,000 to 8,000 people to become ill.
Leakage
Another indication of the state of drinking water
utilities is the amount of water that is lost through
leaking or broken distribution pipes. Environment
Canada (2010b) estimates that, nationally, almost
13 percent of municipal water is lost; the losses are
highest in Quebec, at over 19 percent.
35 The
National Research Council suggests that the losses
are typically 20-30 percent and sometimes,
especially in older systems, as high as 50 percent
(Hunaidi 2000).
Estimates of leakage in Ontario also vary widely.
Environment Canada’s estimate of 12 percent is
considerably lower than several others. According
to the Residential and Civil Construction Alliance
of Ontario (2009), 25 percent of all processed
water leaks into the ground after leaving treatment
plants. One market analysis maintains that 40
percent of purified water is lost through breaks in
water mains (Jones and Henderson, 2010).
36 If the
lowest of the above estimates is correct, the energy
costs alone of treating and pumping the water lost
in Ontario amount to $15 million a year – almost
5 percent of provincial waterworks systems’
expenditures on materials (Maas 2010; Ontario
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2008).
The costs of water-main breaks, including
basement flooding and disruptions to traffic,
power supplies, and subway service, are more
difficult to assess.
37
Substandard Wastewater Systems 
Across Canada, wastewater systems are in even
worse shape than drinking-water systems.
Wastewater systems are one of the country’s largest
sources of pollution (Government of Canada
2010b). In 2008, more than 85 percent of all
reported discharges of water pollution came from
municipal wastewater treatment plants
38
(Ecojustice 2010, using data from Canada’s
National Pollutant Release Inventory). Every year,
wastewater facilities dump more than 150 billion
litres of raw sewage and approximately 1.35
trillion litres of only partially treated sewage into
waterways (Environment Canada 2010a). 
When municipal wastewater is improperly
treated, it can threaten human health, the
environment, and economic activity, including
tourism and fishing. Bacteria, viruses, and
protozoa in sewage can contaminate drinking
water, make beaches unswimmable, and
necessitate the closing of shell-fisheries. Ammonia,
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34 Outbreaks of water-borne illnesses can be extraordinarily expensive. A study commissioned by the Walkerton Inquiry estimated the
economic impact of the tragedy – the tangible costs – to be $64.5 million (Livernois 2002a). A related report estimated the human costs of
the tragedy, i.e., the statistical value of the lives lost and the illnesses suffered, to be an additional $90.8 million (Livernois 2002b). The
Canadian Water Network estimates that health problems related to water pollution cost the Canadian health-care system $300 million
annually; it does not estimate what percentage of these costs are related to municipal drinking water (Government of Canada 2010a).
35 According to another Environment Canada document (2004), approximately 20 percent of municipal water is lost or unaccounted for. 
36 Underground infrastructure in many older cities is in especially poor condition. The average age of Toronto’s water mains is 55 years, about
17 percent are between 80 and 100 years old, and about 7 percent are more than a century old. The system is increasingly vulnerable to
corrosion, cracks, and collapse. On average, the city  has 1,500 water main breaks a year (City of Toronto 2010).
37 The Residential and Civil Construction Alliance of Ontario (2009) estimates that leakage costs Ontarians $700 million annually, and closer
to $1 billion  if environmental costs are included. 
38 Pollution Watch (undated) compiled information from Environment Canada’s National Pollutant Release Inventory. In 2006, Toronto’s
Ashbridges Bay Sewage Treatment Plant headed the list of water polluters in Canada. The plant released more than 13 million kilograms of
pollutants into Lake Ontario that year. Its biggest releases were nitrates, ammonia, and phosphorus; it also released zinc, copper, lead,
cadmium, arsenic, and mercury. Calgary’s Bonnybrook Wastewater Treatment Plant was next, followed by Ottawa’s Robert O. Pickard
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chlorine, and other toxins can poison fish, and
nutrients such as phosphorus can promote the
growth of algae and deplete oxygen in the water,
further harming fish. Sediment can destroy fish
habitat. Harmful effects can be observed 10 or 20
– sometimes, even 100 – kilometres downstream
from where wastewater has been discharged
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2010). 
The Canadian Council of Ministers of the
Environment (CCME) has identified 949
wastewater facilities (shown in Table 2) that need
to be upgraded to provide “secondary” treatment,
which is the minimum acceptable level of treatment
in the United States (Government of Canada
2010b).
39 Of these, CCME has determined that
399 pose high risks to the environment. A
number of coastal systems do not treat their
sewage at all before discharging it into the ocean.
Victoria, for example, merely screens large solids
from its sewage before discharging it into the
Strait of Juan de Fuca. Other systems provide only
minimal, or “primary,” treatment. Even wastewater
systems that do provide secondary treatment may
pollute local waters through spills, bypasses of
treatment facilities, and overflows from combined
sewersduring storms, when facilities cannot
accommodate the increased flows from sewers that
carry both sanitary sewage and storm water. Sarnia
Mayor Mike Bradley did not exaggerate when he
said, “We are still treating the Great Lakes like a
toilet bowl” (QMI 2010).
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39 The 949 facilities are largely municipally owned and operated, but they also include 150 federal facilities. 
Table 2: Number of Canadian Wastewater Facilities Requiring Upgrades to Meet Proposed Federal
Wastewater Standards. 
Source: Government of Canada (2010b), using data collected in 2006 by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment’s Economics





Alberta 6 40 2 48
British Columbia 0 5 8 13
Manitoba 0 81 0 81
New Brunswick 13 44 0 57
Newfoundland and Labrador 0 1 185 186
Nova Scotia 9 37 16 62
Ontario 102 4 3 109
Prince Edward Island 17 7 0 24
Quebec  0 154 33 187
Saskatchewan 0 29 1 30
Yukon 0 1 1 2
Federal 0 0 150 150
Total 147 403 399 949Commentary 330 | 23
Information on the performance of wastewater
treatment plants – the content of their effluent,
and their compliance with provincial regulations –
is spotty, at best. The limited information available
suggests that noncompliance is frequent. In
Saskatchewan, for example, 203 wastewater plants
inspected in 2009 did not comply with provincial
requirements (SaskH2O 2010). Ontario’s
compliance reports for 2008, which are the most
recent available, show that 102 municipal wastewater
facilities exceeded permitted limits for E. coli,
suspended solids, biochemical oxygen demand,
ammonia, phosphorus, pH, or other substances.
Some of the province’s biggest cities – Toronto,
Ottawa, Hamilton, and London – failed to
comply with their certificates of approval or permits.
A number of municipalities were chronic offenders.
The City of Brockville’s water-pollution-control
plant exceeded permitted limits for biochemical-
oxygen demand, indicating excessive organic matter
in the effluent, in all but two months of 2008
(Ontario Ministry of the Environment undated).
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